On June 24, 2025, Iraq witnessed a significant escalation concerning the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Factions within the ruling Coordination Framework Alliance pressed for the enactment of a law to regulate the PMF, known as the “Hashd law” (Mobilization Law/PMF Law). This was against the backdrop of internal opposition from civil, Sunni, and Kurdish blocs, as well as external apprehension, particularly from the United States. This law aimed to establish the PMF as an independent security institution, separate from the Ministries of Defense and Interior, and place it directly under the prime minister's authority as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

The new law was added to the Iraqi parliament’s agenda as a framework to formalize the structure regulating the PMF, an umbrella organization encompassing dozens of armed factions, some of which are ideologically and militarily aligned with Iran.

The bill underwent a second reading in parliament even after several Sunni and Kurdish parties walked out in protest, objecting to how the law was introduced to the session’s agenda.  

In 2016, the PMF Commission was officially established. By 2020, PMF fighters received the same salary and allowances as Iraqi army soldiers—1,250,000 Iraqi dinars (approximately $1,000) per month, along with housing and other benefits. Their fighters were also formally organized into a military brigade system.

In practice, each armed faction within the Popular Mobilization Forces retains its own name, fighters, and political or ideological affiliations. These factions also continue to divide spheres of influence across their operational provinces.

A security incident in late July 2025 underscored the ongoing tensions in Iraq regarding the new PMF law. Members of the PMF, specifically from Kata'ib Hezbollah, forcibly entered a Ministry of Agriculture government office in Baghdad. They opened fire on a security force dispatched to manage the situation, injuring several officers. Subsequently, authorities apprehended 14 PMF fighters from Brigades 45 and 46 and referred them for legal proceedings. The Prime Minister initiated an investigation into the event, including the unauthorized deployment of the security force.

A social media campaign, spearheaded by accounts linked to factions supporting or aligned with the PMF, coincided with the legislative debate. These accounts heavily promoted several hashtags advocating for the law, such as #العراق_سيد_نفسه (Iraq Is Its Own Master), #إقرار_قانون_الحشد (Pass the PMF Law), and #لا_منة_لأحد_على_العراق (Iraq Is Indebted To No One).

When an account named Haider Al ‘Eqabi (@haider1975ww) reposted an old tweet of his from December 2024 containing the hashtag #العراق_سيد_نفسه (Iraq Is Its Own Master), the post received 44 retweets, propelling the hashtag to its peak activity the following day, July 24, 2025.

The number of posts containing the hashtag #العراق_سيد_نفسه (Iraq Is Its Own Master), along with the two related hashtags #لا_منة_لأحد_على_العراق (Iraq Is Indebted To No One) and #إقرار_قانون_الحشد (Pass the PMF Law), reached nearly 11,000 posts between July 23 and the end of the first week of August 2025—a span of roughly two weeks—averaging about 370 posts per day.

However, the reach of these posts far outpaced their volume. Over just two weeks, they generated an estimated 14 million impressions, averaging around 471,000 impressions per day.

The first spike occurred on July 24, while the second—and largest—surge came on August 6, coinciding with renewed attempts to place discussion of the law on the Iraqi Parliament’s agenda, attempts that have so far failed due to the lack of a legal quorum.

A keyword cloud highlighted the most frequently used terms across the posts.

The hashtag #العراق_سيد_نفسه (Iraq Is Its Own Master) appeared alongside several others, including #لا_منة_لأحد_على_العراق (Iraq Is Indebted To No One), #إقرار_قانون_الحشد (Pass the PMF Law), #الحشد_الشعبي (Popular Mobilization Forces), and #رعد_الدهلكي (Ra’d Al Dahlaki).

The keyword cloud also featured other terms related to Iraqi politics, such as “الحسين” (Hussein), “أمريكا” (America), “البرلمان” (Parliament), “السفارة” (Embassy), and “واشنطن” (Washington).

Posts using #العراق_سيد_نفسه (Iraq Is Its Own Master) promoted a narrative claiming that rejecting the PMF law—and denying it independence from Iraq’s armed forces—amounts to U.S. interference in Iraqi affairs. The hashtag's geographic distribution mirrored this framing, appearing most frequently in Iraq, then Lebanon, and at much lower, yet relatively similar, volumes in Saudi Arabia, the United States, Bahrain, and Iran.

What was striking about the participating accounts concerned the statistics of the job titles of the account holders involved in the hashtags. More than a quarter of the accounts stated their job was "Imam," while less than 10 percent described themselves as politicians.

The name "تحالف الفتح" (Fatah Alliance) also featured prominently in the keyword cloud generated from account bios. Established in 2018 and led by Hadi al-Amiri, this alliance serves as the primary political representation for Shia factions associated with the PMF.

Other common terms included “الحشد الشعبي” (Popular Mobilization Forces) and expressions linked to Shia religious identity like “عاشوراء الكرامة” (Ashura of Dignity). Also frequently popping up was Qais Khazali, the secretary-general of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq—a Shia political and military group with an armed faction.

Analysis of the data revealed that the activity of these accounts was largely inorganic. Retweets constituted over 60% of the posts, with original posts making up only 25.5% of the total. The publishing patterns clearly indicated amplification, especially during peak times, as the graph of original posts closely mirrored that of retweets.

Fake Accounts Drove Most Engagement

We extracted data on the hashtags using Meltwater. Analysis showed that the top accounts posted 50 to 500 times within a two-week period.

The account @johnsdfdsf343 johnsdfdsf86009 topped the list, and when we tried to verify it, "X" informed us that the account was temporarily restricted due to suspicious activity.

By bypassing the warning we discovered that the account was newly created in July 2025. It had no followers and was following no one, yet it had made approximately 503 posts. Of these, 500 included the hashtag #العراق_سيد_نفسه (Iraq Is Its Own Master).

AI OR NOT revealed that the account’s profile picture was AI-generated, and data analysis showed that all its posts containing the hashtag #العراق_سيد_نفسه (Iraq Is Its Own Master) were merely reposts from other accounts.

An analysis of the account’s posting times confirmed that it published around 500 posts in just six minutes, with an interval of roughly 17 seconds between each post—a pace that is impossible for a human to achieve. The analysis also showed that the account was exclusively active during those six minutes, indicating its probable operation by an automated tool or program designed to rapidly generate a specific number of posts before deactivation. These factors strongly suggest the account is a fake bot.

Ranking second in interactivity, the account "ناصر الكراي @NAlkray307" posted 396 times, exclusively through retweets. Our attempt to verify the account resulted in a warning message indicating a temporary restriction due to unusual activity.

We bypassed the platform's warning and found this account to be clearly similar to the previous one. Created in July 2025, it had only one follower and followed no one. Nevertheless, the account had posted 399 times, with 396 of these being retweets using the hashtag #العراق_سيد_نفسه (Iraq Is Its Own Master).

The tweets from both accounts focused on supporting the PMF and rejecting any kind of control over them or their integration into the Iraqi armed forces. However, at the same time, we noticed both accounts publishing posts in support of the Sadrist Movement in Iraq, which is affiliated with Muqtada al-Sadr.

In the same pattern, the third account, named "Mohammed Qasim Ali @LyQasm8578", posted 212 posts, all of which were in the form of resharing posts from other accounts. When tried to verify the account, the same message appeared, stating that the account had been temporarily restricted due to unusual behavior.

This account was no different from the previous two accounts. It was a recently created account, appearing in April 2025, and had published 225 posts since its creation, 212 of which were in the last two weeks, all of which were reshares from other accounts that included the hashtag "Iraq Is Its Own Master".

We observed consistent repetition in posts and frequent re-sharing from specific accounts, indicating a recurrent posting pattern characteristic of fake accounts. This confirms that the @LyQasm85784 account is indeed a fake account, similar to the two previous accounts.

Ranked fourth among the most interactive accounts was “Hassoun Al ‘Alani @HswnL36963”, which had published 173 posts since its creation in July 2025. All of them were retweets from other accounts, and every single post included the hashtag #العراق_سيد_نفسه (Iraq Is Its Own Master).

In addition to the account's recent creation, the absence of a profile picture, the appearance of the account's username as random letters and numbers, and the presence of only one follower, all confirmed that it was a fake, inauthentic account.

In fifth place on the list, the account "Bassam Huthayl @hdhyl63298" was not very different from the accounts we examined before, as the same message appeared stating that the account was restricted due to unusual behavior.

The account followed the same fake-account pattern as the others. Created in July 2025, it has no followers and follows no one, yet it posted 158 times since its creation—all of them retweets from other accounts, and every single post contained the hashtag #العراق_سيد_نفسه (Iraq Is Its Own Master).

An examination of accounts, including "Marwa Al Janabi @marmarmzhar," "Hassan Retweet @JmylAs65996," "Domou’ @dmw12698926970," "Afraa Al Shemmari @afraa195," and "Baneen Ali @baneen193ali.

revealed consistent patterns. All these accounts were created in 2025 and followed a limited number of profiles. A striking observation was the unusually high volume of content posted during the last week of July 2025, which predominantly consisted of retweets from other accounts.

The reposted material was highly repetitive, carrying nearly identical wording and consistently promoting support for either Iraqi Shiite factions or the Popular Mobilization Forces.

Network Analysis Reveals Media Figures Linked to the Campaign 

Using Gephi network analysis software, we prepared and visualized the data to identify the accounts orchestrating this coordinated campaign and generating content that fake accounts then amplified through retweets.

We visually mapped the networks involved in the "PMF Law" media campaign. The resulting network graph showed clusters of smaller, interconnected networks. Accounts in the upper part of the map displayed stronger ties, whereas the smaller networks located towards the bottom appeared more dispersed.

To identify the accounts with the most widely circulated content, we focused on those that served as primary sources of content within the network graph—particularly in the upper region of the map.

Among the most active content-producing accounts, later amplified by fake accounts, was “Fatim Baqeri @Fatim___9”. This Iraqi account, created in 2021, uses a youthful image of Hassan Nasrallah as its profile picture. Despite its relatively short existence, the account has amassed over 12,000 followers and has published approximately 14,500 posts since its inception.

The account published only two posts containing the hashtags #العراق_سيد_نفسه (Iraq Is Its Own Master) and #اقرار_قانون_الحشد (Pass the PMF Law). The posts explicitly urged a vote in favor of the PMF law and portrayed support for it as a rejection of U.S. interference in Iraq's sovereignty. They generated significant engagement.

Next to the Fatim Baqeri account, another Iraqi account, “Zahraa Alyasri @zahraalyase22,” emerged. Created in 2024, its bio states it is the fourth account operated by the same user, suggesting that previous accounts were likely shut down due to unusual activity or hate speech.

Analysis of the account revealed a consistent pattern of publishing political propaganda in support of the PMF. This often included accusatory language directed at individuals who opposed the PMF's political and security objectives.

Another Iraqi account, "Zuhair Qassim - Zoheer @pres_iq," appeared near Zahraa Al Yasseri's account on the network map. This account belongs to an Iraqi journalist named Zuhair Qassim.

A review of the account revealed that Qassem is a supporter of the Popular Mobilization Forces and manages a digital space called "Ummat Al Hashd" (Mobilization Nation), which covers political news of PMF-affiliated representatives in the Iraqi Parliament.

Another Iraqi account named "Sanad Al Hamdany | سند الحمداني @SanadAlhamdany" appeared on the right side of the network map. This is an Iraqi account owned by Sanad Al Hamdany, the manager of Alahad TV, an Iraqi channel established in 2008 and linked to Qais Al-Khazali, the Secretary-General of the "Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq" movement.

On June 22, 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice seized the domain of Alahad TV, citing its affiliation with the Iranian Islamic Radio and Television Union, which had itself been placed on the sanctions list by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on October 22, 2020.

- This content is published in collaboration with Jummar media.