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"The Free Masked Men": A Deepfake-Fueled Campaign to Overthrow the Saudi Regime Meets Pro-Regime Resistance From Bots

"The Free Masked Men": A Deepfake-Fueled Campaign to Overthrow the Saudi Regime Meets Pro-Regime Resistance From Bots

 

The report reveals a coordinated campaign driven by automated accounts and false content under the hashtag #الملثمون_الأحرار (The Free Masked Men), calling for the overthrow of the Saudi regime. This campaign was met with counterattacks from pro-regime Saudi bots.


 

In May 2025, videos began circulating across the Arab online sphere—particularly in Gulf and Saudi digital spaces—showing masked individuals wearing the ghutra, the traditional head covering in the region, calling for protests against the political regime in Saudi Arabia.

 

 

These clips spread across social media platforms, shared by numerous accounts using hashtags such as #حركة_الملثمين (The Masked Movement), #حركة_الملثمين_الأحرار (The Free Masked Men Movement), and #تلثم_وتكلم (Mask Up and Speak), with the aim of disseminating the masked videos and posting content critical of Saudi Arabia’s political system.

The hashtags first appeared on May 20, 2025, at exactly 9:00 p.m., when an account named Nadir Al Shamri (@alshamriuNadir) announced the launch of the Free Masked Men Movement, calling on the Saudi people to “break the silence.”

However, an advanced search on X reveals that the masked videos began circulating earlier in the month, specifically through an account called Fuad Kawther (@fuadkawther), which posted multiple clips of masked individuals from different regions inside Saudi Arabia between May 8 and May 23, 2025.

 

 

These videos sparked a large-scale digital campaign inside Saudi Arabia, which quickly spread to several other Arab countries. The calls for protest targeted the Saudi political system and included criticism of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

In response, a counter-campaign emerged from within Saudi Arabia, attacking the masked individuals and mockingly labeling them with the satirical hashtag #المخنثين_الأحرار (The Free Effeminates).

 

Is This a Genuine Saudi Uprising?

On the evening of May 20, 2025, an account named Nadir Al Shamri (@alshamriuNadir) posted an announcement declaring the launch of the Free Masked Men Movement. The post included a video clip of a masked man wearing sunglasses, calling for peaceful action against the Saudi regime.

 

   

 

The post went viral, garnering over 70,000 views, and videos of Saudi masked men spread widely under the hashtag #حركة_الملثمين_الأحرار (Free Masked Men Movement). The hashtag peaked on May 23 at 7:00 a.m., surpassing 67,000 posts—most of them on X —and involving around 28,000 accounts.

 

 

However, the hashtag’s spread showed striking patterns: within just two weeks, it reached an estimated 457 million views, averaging nearly 33 million per day—figures considered highly unusual. The campaign's reach was most extensive in the Gulf region, particularly Saudi Arabia, followed by Yemen. The United States, Egypt, and Iraq also saw some presence, though significantly less.

 

 

At the city level, Riyadh, Mecca, and Jeddah topped the list of locations where the hashtag was most actively shared, followed by Cairo, Sana’a, Jizan, and Asir, with similar posting volumes among them—though still notably lower than the top three cities. According to the chronological sequence of published clips, the first recorded video of a masked individual inside Saudi Arabia calling for protests was filmed in Jeddah.

 

 

The posting pattern associated with the hashtag relied heavily on retweets, which accounted for roughly 49% of total interactions, followed by comments at around 41%—indicating a notable level of discussion and engagement surrounding the masked men’s videos and the hashtag #حركة_الملثمين_الأحرار (The Masked Movement for Freedom). In contrast, original content linked to the hashtag represented only 4.1% of total posts, suggesting limited self-produced material compared to the extensive resharing of existing content.

 

     

 

The word cloud of the most frequently used terms—alongside the list of related hashtags—showed that #حركة_الملثمين_الأحرار (The Masked Movement for Freedom) was the most repeated and widely circulated across posts. It was closely associated with a number of anti–Saudi political hashtags, including #الشعب_يريد_إسقاط_آل_سعود (The People Demand the Fall of Al Saud) and #عشر_ابن_سلمان_عجاف (Ten Lean Years of bin Salman). At the same time, several hashtags supportive of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman also surfaced, reflecting the presence of a counter-narrative within the engagement—particularly visible in the comments section.

 

   

 

Posts featuring the masked individuals drew a large number of critical and hostile comments. Some commenters questioned the authenticity of the videos and even whether a group called “The Free Masked Men” exists at all, suggesting the whole matter might be fabricated or staged. This prompted us to re-examine and analyze the circulating clips to assess their credibility.

 

 

Using Sensity, a tool specialized in detecting AI-generated and DeepFake images and videos, it was found that the clip posted by the account @fuadkawther on May 17, 2025, titled “The Masked Man of Medina Enters the Ring”, showed a high likelihood of being AI-generated due to significant alterations in its content. The same applied to another clip posted by the same account on May 19, 2025, titled “The Masked Man of Jeddah Praises His Counterpart in Medina”, which also tested with a high probability of fabrication.

 

     

 

As for the third clip, titled “The Masked Man of Riyadh,” the initial analysis indicated it was intact and showed no obvious manipulation—no frame distortions or voice-pitch fluctuations like in the previous clips. However, a deeper analysis using the Sensity tool and an advanced AI model suggested a likelihood of edits made with video-editing software.

 

 

This analysis presents two possibilities: the first is that the video underwent normal, commonly used edits found in any ordinary footage; the second points to suspicious alterations that significantly raise the likelihood of fabrication. To determine which scenario is more plausible, we revisited the video’s publication context and examined the nature of the account that posted it.

 

Instigators of the ‘Free Masked Men’ are Based Abroad

The video “Masked Man of Riyadh” first spread through an account named Nadir Al Shamri @alshamriuNadir, a relatively new account created in 2022. The account’s profile picture, when compared to the person appearing in the video, showed a match, suggesting that the account uses a real personal photo. The account’s cover image contains symbols indicating the owner’s affiliation with the Shammar tribe, which is based in the Hail region of Najd—matching the geographic location stated in the account’s bio.

 

 

However, in the pinned video on the account, Nadir Al Shamri appears alongside Nasr al-Din Amer, the head of the Yemeni News Agency and deputy head of the Ansar Allah (Houthi) Media Authority. Amer is considered a close associate of the Houthi group in Yemen, playing a prominent role in the group’s official media apparatus. He serves as its public voice, conveying its positions and news, and frequently appears in official statements and announcements issued by the group. Arabi Facts Hub has previously exposed his involvement in earlier campaigns supportive of the Houthis.

 

 

The account posted a video from Yemen in November 2024, and Nadir Al Shamri published another video from Yemen on January 19, 2025, raising the possibility that he resides in Sana’a rather than Saudi Arabia. This is supported by a recent video posted by Al Shamri on his YouTube channel titled “Here is Yemen,” in which he praises “Abdul Malik Al Houthi.”

MWmetadata revealed that this video was published on Saturday, May 3, 2025, strongly suggesting that Nadir Al Shamri is based in the Yemeni capital.

 

   

 

The other account that posted the earlier videos of the masked men — which we confirmed to be fabricated — is Fuad Kawther | @fuadkawther, created in 2017. This account is known for its opposition to the Saudi regime and was among the first to publish the masked men’s videos before the hashtag “The Free Masked Men Movement” began trending.

 

    

 

The account owner, as shown in the profile picture, is Counsellor Fuad Kawther, a Saudi dissident who left the country in 2019 following security harassment by the regime. While there is no precise information about his current place of residence, a review of his YouTube channel data indicates the channel is located in the United States.


   

 

The “Fuad Kawther” account is linked to a newly created account from 2025 called “Masked Man of Riyadh,” which published the original video clip on May 21, 2025. A review of the account’s archive shows that it relies heavily on resharing video clips and posts from Fuad Kawther.

 

Automated Accounts for Amplification

Using MeltWater, we extracted a random sample of 20,000 posts and then conducted a data analysis, resulting in a list of the ten most active accounts in posting and using the hashtag #حركة_الملثمين_الأحرار (Free Masked Men Movement). At the top of the list was the account “Fada’el Al Muslim” (The Good Traits of A Muslim) @Mr_smmsm, which published 47 posts, all linked to the hashtag in question.

 

 

However, when analyzing the account’s interaction pattern, it was found to be a commercial account with over 600,000 followers. All 47 posts it published were replies to other accounts’ posts that had used the hashtag #حركة_الملثمين_الأحرار (Free Masked Men Movement), rather than original posts.

 

 

Through an analysis of posting times and the intervals between posts, it became clear that the account follows a non-human pattern—posting around the clock, especially during the night, with peak activity at 5 a.m. Posts often appear at very short intervals, sometimes down to zero seconds apart. This clearly indicates that the account, in addition to being commercial, is automated.

Next on the list of the most active accounts was "Boyka Boyka @ashor98tote", which published 36 posts, most of them retweets containing the hashtag

“Free_Masked_Movement”. This account was created in 2016, and its registered location is Saudi Arabia.

 

 

An analysis of the account’s posting times showed that it follows non-human posting patterns, publishing in the early morning hours (between 12 a.m. and 4 a.m.). The account also posts intensively at specific times, with very short intervals between posts—sometimes down to zero seconds—while leaving large gaps between other posting times. In addition, the account uses a non-personal profile picture and a username containing random letters, both of which are common traits of automated (bot-generated) accounts.

 

 

In fourth place was the account "Dul @Dul2166", a recently created Saudi account dating back to 2024. This account published 32 posts, most of which were reposts of content containing the hashtag #حركة_الملثمين_الأحرار (Free Masked Men Movement).

 

 

However, the quantitative analysis of Dul’s posting times showed an almost natural posting pattern, with a concentration of intense activity during specific time periods, accompanied by very short intervals—close to zero—between posts. The account also lacks a personal profile picture and uses a username made up of random letters, strongly suggesting that it is automated.

 

 

Ranked fifth among the accounts most engaged with the hashtag was the account "السيد @AlaiezAlthane", which posted 31 times, most of them in the form of quote retweets. The account was created in 2023.



 

A quantitative analysis of posting times showed that the account follows a semi-scheduled pattern, posting daily at specific times with a fixed number of posts, and with short intervals between each post. This suggests the account may be semi-automated or using post-scheduling software.


 

In second place came the account "Mansour Khamis @KhamisSleeh", which posted 47 tweets—similar in number to the previous account—but followed a pattern hostile to the hashtag, unlike the earlier accounts that amplified its spread. He posted mocking responses to the hashtag and defended the Saudi regime, using hashtags such as #خونة_الأوطان (Traitors of the Homeland) and "#حركة_المخنثين_الأحرا (Movement of the Effeminate) to attack accounts promoting the "#Free_Masked_Movement" hashtag.

This highlights the existence of a counter–digital campaign. But before delving deeper into this counter-campaign, the question remains: If these accounts are amplifying the hashtag’s spread, then who is leading this campaign?

 

 

Leading the Campaign

Using Gephi, we obtained a map showing the distribution of account networks interacting with the hashtag #حركة_الملثمين_الاحرار “The Free Masked Men Movement.” The map shows these networks split into two main clusters, with dense links in the center and strong connections both among the central accounts themselves and between these central accounts and others on the network’s periphery.

The upper cluster in the map represents accounts that interact with contect from central accounts through retweets and quotes, while the lower cluster represents networks of accounts that interact with those same central accounts through replies. These replies are split between amplifying responses—such as those from the account “Fada’el Al Muslim @mr_smmsm”—and critical or opposing responses, such as those from “Mansour Khamis @KhamisSleeh.”

To identify the central accounts engaged with the hashtag, we redrew the network map by merging the two clusters, revealing the central accounts themselves and their surrounding networks—accounts that interact with them through either reposts or comments.

The upper cluster on the map represents accounts that engage with content from central accounts through retweets and quote tweets, while the lower cluster represents account networks that interact with the same central accounts via replies. These replies are split between amplification replies—such as those from the account "Fada’el Al Muslim @mr_smmsm"—and critical or opposing replies, as in the case of "Mansour Khamis @KhamisSleeh".

We merged the two clusters to redraw the network map, revealing the central accounts and their surrounding networks that interacted with the hashtag — through reposts or comments.

 

   

 

The network analysis also revealed strong interconnections and close proximity among central accounts, with significant overlap in their interacting networks, particularly in the map's central area. The bright dots in the image below clearly highlight these central accounts.


 

The largest network of accounts was clustered around an account called “Konan Asiri @konan_asiri,” a Saudi account created in 2022. The account appears to use a fake name and profile picture.

Despite this, posts from “Konan Asiri” achieved wide reach and engagement. One of his tweets, which included a video clip of a masked individual claiming affiliation with “#حركة_الملثمين_الاحرار” (The Free Masked Men Movement), garnered over 850,000 views and more than 4,300 likes. The account posted that King Salman had died, citing "insider information." However, no official source has corroborated this claim.

 

 

On the same day the previous post was published, the account posted another message accompanied by an image it claimed was an official statement from “#حركة_الملثمين_الاحرار” (The Free Masked Men Movement), announcing that members of the Saudi army and public security had joined the movement, and calling for more people to join.

The post accumulated over 490 shares, 2,900 likes, and 660 comments. However, no official authority or individual has corroborated the presence of members of the movement within the Saudi army or public security forces.


 

The “Asiri” account is strongly connected to another central account that appeared on the network analysis map — that of Abdullah El Sherif, a well-known Egyptian opposition figure. He posted a single tweet containing a collection of videos showing masked individuals, accompanied by “#حركة_الملثمين_الاحرار” (The Free Masked Men Movement).

 

 

Although the account posted only a single tweet, it achieved wide reach, garnering around 17 million views, over 4,000 retweets and quote tweets, and more than 4,000 likes. Thanks to this massive reach, the post became the most viral under the “#حركة_الملثمين_الاحرار” (The Free Masked Men Movement) hashtag and played a major role in amplifying its spread. The network analysis map also shows a huge number of accounts interacting with Abdullah El Sherif’s post, using it as a key driver to boost the hashtag’s content.


 

"Dr. Sam Youssef Ph.D., M.Sc., DPT. @drhossamsamy6" was identified as a central account within an interconnected network, linked to two other accounts through shared interactions. This account is known for its controversial participation in discussions concerning the Arab region, asserting a Muslim identity and claiming multiple psychology degrees.




The account posted 13 times, all from the United States. One of these posts included a widely circulated video that was claimed to have been filmed inside “one of the Saudi ministry buildings.” However, we found no evidence within the video to verify the accuracy of this claim.

 

 

We also found no clear evidence indicating that the account is automated, as Botometer results suggested the account is likely genuine. Likewise, an analysis of the posting time distribution showed a semi-natural temporal pattern, with short time gaps between some posts at specific times, which reduces the likelihood of using automated scheduling tools.


 

The previously mentioned accounts were indirectly connected to another central account, that of "Ahmed Mohammed Binnah @AhmedBinh79," a Yemeni account whose owner identifies himself as "Ahmed Binnah, a patriotic folk poet from Yemen." A review of the account’s archive suggests he supports the Houthi group.

 

 

One of the account’s posts gained significant reach and engagement, in which it praised “#حركة_الملثمين_الاحرار” (The Free Masked Men Movement) and called for “purging the Land of the Two Holy Mosques from the filth of Al Saud’s regime.” The post was accompanied by a video showing a Yemeni man expressing his solidarity with the movement, while the features, appearance, and clothing of people visible in the background indicated that the footage was filmed in Yemen.

 

 

These central accounts led the interaction under the “#حركة_الملثمين_الاحرار” (The Free Masked Men Movement) hashtag, pumping out large volumes of posts and videos that participating accounts in the campaign reshared and amplified. In contrast, a counter digital campaign emerged, attacking these accounts in the comments and posting their content under hashtags such as “#حركة_المخنثين_الاحرار” (The Free Effeminate Movement) and “#خونة_الأوطان” (Traitors to the Homeland).

 

A Saudi Counter-Campaign

On the other hand, and in parallel with the spread of the masked men’s videos and the “#حركة_الملثمين_الاحرار” (The Free Masked Men Movement) hashtag, some Saudi accounts began using the “#خونة_الأوطان” (Traitors to the Homeland) hashtag to label anyone who shared these videos or engaged with their hashtag, specifically before May 22, 2025.

 

 

Starting on May 22, Saudi accounts began using a new hashtag, “#حركة_المخانيث_الأحرار” (The Free Effeminates Movement), to comment on the spread of the videos of the Saudi masked men. These comments quickly evolved into posts carrying various hashtags, such as “#حركة_المخانيث_الأحرار” (The Free Effeminates Movement), “#حركة_المخنثين_الأحرار” (The Free Sissy Movement), and “#حركة_المثليين_الأحرار” (The Free Homosexual Movement), as a way to ridicule or disparage those using the original hashtag.


   

 

The word cloud of the most prominent terms in the campaign, along with the list of the most frequently used hashtags in the posts, shows a growing use of the hashtag “#حركة_المخانيث_الأحرار” (The Free Effeminates Movement), compared to a relative decline in the use of the hashtag “#خونة_الأوطان” (Traitors to the Homeland). Meanwhile, the hashtag “#حركة_الملثمين_الأحرار” (The Free Masked Men Movement) remains present in a large number of posts, reflecting the degree of overlap and engagement between the two digital campaigns.

 

   

 

Analysis of the campaign showed that around 2,600 accounts participated by posting nearly 4,000 posts, including original posts, reposts, quotes, and comments. Engagement peaked on May 23, 2025 — the same day that recorded the highest activity for the “#حركة_الملثمين_الأحرار” (The Free Masked Men Movement) campaign. Despite the difference in scale between the two campaigns, this counter-campaign achieved an estimated total reach of 36.5 million, with an average daily reach estimated at around 1.22 million.


   

 

This large reach, compared to the relatively limited number of posts, is attributed to the pattern of interaction within the campaign. Analysis revealed that original content accounted for only about 7% of total posts, while reposts and quotes together made up around 49%. Comments accounted for roughly 44.5% of total posts, indicating that the campaign relied heavily on engaging with existing content rather than producing new material.

 

 

The distribution of posting locations did not differ much from that of the “#حركة_الملثمين_الأحرار” (The Free Masked Men Movement) campaign, with the vast majority of posts originating from Saudi Arabia, followed by a minority of posts from the United States. Yemen, the United Kingdom, and Egypt appeared next, with relatively similar numbers.



 

Hierarchically Structured Campaign

Using Meltwater, we collected data on all posts related to the campaign. After cleaning and analyzing the data, we used Gephi to map the network of participating accounts. The map revealed a clear structural connection resembling a hierarchical structure, with a large network of accounts linked to smaller networks arranged in a tiered pattern.

 

The largest networks cluster around the account “Fayez Al Malki @fayez_malki,” a well-known Saudi actor and television presenter who served as UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador in the Gulf states from 2009 to 2012. He has also been the Chairman of the National Committee for Social Responsibility at the Federation of Saudi Chambers since November 2024, in addition to serving as a humanitarian ambassador for the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center.


 

However, when we reviewed the archive of Fayez Al Malki’s account, we found no use of hashtags related to the campaign, such as “#حركة_المخانيث_الاحرار” (The Free Effeminates Movement) or “#خونة_الأوطان” (Traitors to the Homeland). We therefore reanalyzed the data to understand Al Malki’s pattern of participation in the campaign, and it became clear that he had posted a single tweet on May 23, 2025, which gained wide traction, as many accounts shared it and amplified its reach through comments. Nevertheless, either Al Malki later deleted the post, or the X’s administration removed it for containing discriminatory and hateful speech.

The previous image shows that the links extracted from Meltwater’s data led us to a deleted post, while the replies to it were still available and displayed Al Malki’s username. This indicates that Fayez Al Malki, a figure close to Mohammed bin Salman, indirectly contributed to amplifying the hashtag through his roughly 8 million followers.

 

 

Al Malki’s account is indirectly connected to another account active in engaging with the hashtag — “Saud Al Nufeie @S_m_sa88,” a recently created Saudi account dating back to 2025. One of his posts using the hashtag “#حركة_المخانيث_الاحرار” (The Free Effeminates Movement) gained wide circulation, in which he pointed to the participation of Egyptian accounts claiming to be Saudi and posting the hashtag “#حركة_الملثمين_الاحرار” (The Free Masked Men Movement).

 

 

In addition to being recently created, the account does not display a profile picture and uses random numbers and letters in its username — features consistent with automated accounts.


 

Al Nufeie is also indirectly linked to another account, “@qrnas_ksa,” a Saudi account created in 2024 that lists its location as Paris. A review of the account’s archive and interaction patterns showed similarities to the previous account: it is newly created, lacks a profile picture, does not use a real name, has a username composed of random letters and numbers, and posts pro–Saudi government content.

These same characteristics apply to most of the accounts visible in the network analysis map, giving the impression of a hierarchically organized structure of inauthentic automated accounts created to amplify pro–Saudi government content and attack any material critical of it.

 

 Prepared by Ibrahim Hilal