As the first phase of the Gaza ceasefire—brokered between the Palestinian resistance and Israel—came to an end, the United States launched hundreds of airstrikes on Houthi-controlled sites in Yemen beginning in mid-March 2025. According to the Houthis, the strikes killed more than 124 civilians and injured 256 others, most of them women and children.

In the second week of April 2025, Yemen witnessed an unprecedented escalation in the pace of U.S. airstrikes, with more than ten night raids targeting several provinces. These included areas south and east of the capital, Sana’a, as well as Al Hafa Camp and Al Nahdayn and Nuqum mountains—all military sites under Houthi control. The Houthis revealed only limited details about the targeted locations, while the U.S. military (CENTCOM) did not issue any specific clarifications about the objectives of the strikes.

Amid this escalation, a hashtag—#مدري (“Madri” meaning “I don’t know”)—began circulating on Yemeni social media platforms. The hashtag calls on Yemenis to withhold any information related to the U.S. airstrikes, the targeted sites, or operations carried out by the Houthi group. However, the hashtag’s widespread reach prompted many activists, bloggers, and other accounts to use it—alongside others—to raise questions about administrative corruption in Houthi-controlled areas and to demand their civil rights, such as overdue salaries and improved electricity services. Some users also referenced cases of journalists being kidnapped for attempting to report the truth.

"#Madri": A Security Directive Disguised as an Online Campaign

The hashtag "#مدري" (I Don’t Know) peaked for the first time on April 5, 2025, with over 54,000 posts recorded by April 15. The hashtag gained significant traction, generating approximately 280 million impressions and averaging a daily reach of 17.5 million.

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When tracing the origins of the hashtag that started on April 5, 2025, it was found to have been launched by a Yemeni media figure named Abdel Hafiz Mujib, who serves as the news director at Al-Sahat TV, a channel supportive of the Houthis. However, a temporal analysis of its spread reveals that other Yemeni accounts had already begun using the hashtag as early as late March 2025.

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The hashtag first appeared on the evening of March 27, 2025, posted by a Yemeni account in the form of a “directive.” It reached its first peak on April 5, when journalist Abdel Hafiz Mujib reshared it, contributing to its wider spread. Later, the hashtag recorded its highest peak on April 10—within the analysis period that extended to mid-April—amassing over 292 million impressions in just 20 days.

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Despite the widespread reach of the hashtag, original content made up no more than seven percent of total posts, while reposts and quote posts together accounted for over 50 percent, and replies made up approximately 42 percent. The word cloud of the most frequently used terms in the hashtag’s posts included vocabulary typically associated with propaganda, likely originating from accounts close to or supportive of the Houthi group.

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The posts under the hashtag also included words and slogans that criticize and attack the Houthi group, such as "#الشعب_داري_ياحوثي" (The People Know, Houthi) and "#الحوثي_جماعة_إرهابية" (Houthi Is A Terrorist Group).

Although the hashtag addresses an internal issue specific to Yemen, the analysis revealed that Saudi Arabia ranked second in terms of the most engaged countries with the hashtag. This suggests a level of media amplification within the circulating discourse, as the hashtag was used to politically promote the Houthi group, alongside counter-campaigns labeling the group as "terrorist."

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Security Accounts Behind the Campaign

The interaction with the hashtag began in late March through a Yemeni account using the name Mubarak Al-Asali, who published what he described as a "security memo" urging people to report any accounts that posted images of U.S. airstrike sites. This account identifies itself as an alternative to the editor-in-chief of Al-Maseer, a Yemeni newspaper close to the Houthis. Several other accounts shared the post, including another alternative account named "Abu Khaled Al-Dhaheri Alternative," which reposted Al-Asali’s content, accompanied by an image bearing the logo of the "Security and Intelligence Service," warning citizens not to speak about the airstrikes, claiming that U.S. forces were spying on phone calls.

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Although the two aforementioned accounts are newly created alternative accounts, a significant number of accounts that interacted with them were also recent. It seems that most of these accounts are either close to or supportive of the Houthi group. Among them one stands out: an account named "Al-Zaher Al-Zaher." This account fits all the characteristics of a fake (automated) account: it was recently created, does not use a real profile picture, and has a username composed of random letters and numbers (@lzhrlzhr425875). It was notably active in amplifying the hashtag "#مدري" through comments and reposts.

Upon reviewing the archive of the "Al-Zaher Al-Zaher" account, it became clear that this account intensively shares posts from another account called "News 24 Abu Qaed Al Baydhani Media" (@aaa73753). This account is relatively new, having been created in 2021. What raises suspicion is the presence of the word "مؤتمت Automated" under its username, indicating the potential use of automated tools. The post that "Al-Zaher Al-Zaher" shared from this account contained a video promoting political propaganda for the Houthi group, claiming that five thousand American soldiers were killed in the Red Sea—an allegation for which we found no evidence to support.

Upon reviewing the archive of "Abu Qaed Al Baydhani", it was found to be an automated (bot) account that is part of the Houthi rumor machine, as it spreads false news and disinformation. When we traced another account associated with this one, "@wert7715" (Abu Qaed Al Baydhani... Media2), we found it to be quite similar. It is also a recently created account, using an image of "Badr Al-Houthi" as its profile picture, with a background image of Hassan Nasrallah. The account continues to intensively promote political propaganda in favor of the Houthi group, including false news and disinformation, such as a claim that the U.S. aircraft carrier Harry Truman had been decommissioned.

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What was also suspicious about "Abu Qaed Al Baydhani... Media 2" was that when we visited the account it referred to in its description as its official account, we were directed back to the automated account "News 24 Abu Qaed Al Baydhani Media" (@aaa73753). This suggests that these accounts employ a "closed loop" tactic, where fake accounts exchange, repost, and amplify content, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of interaction.

The Most Interactive Accounts On the Hashtag

To verify the accounts leading the interaction with this hashtag, we used Meltwater to pull a sample of 20,000 posts and analyze the data, resulting in a list of the most interactive accounts with the hashtag "#مدري" (I Don’t Know).

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At the top of the list of the most active accounts was the "Madri" account (@md9013712576636), with a total of 272 posts. The account is newly created and uses a profile photo of Yahya Saree, the spokesperson for the Houthi-affiliated Yemeni Armed Forces. A review of its activity reveals that the account posts intensively and operates in coordination with a network of other accounts to amplify its visibility and grow its follower base. Its content is largely centered on political propaganda in support of the Houthi group, frequently spreading disinformation and false claims.

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Although the account exhibits all the hallmarks of an inauthentic or fake account—such as being recently created, lacking a real profile picture, and using a random username—we applied a custom script to statistically analyze its posting times. As shown in the accompanying chart, the account publishes a high volume of posts at fixed intervals, often just two minutes apart, and continues to post consistently throughout the day, including during late-night hours—from 1:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m.—and well into midnight. This pattern of nonstop activity strongly deviates from typical human behavior, providing clear evidence that the account is automated and inauthentic.

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The second most active account using the hashtag "#مدري" (I Don’t Know) was “Rajy Allah” (@rajyallh13), which posted 105 times. Like the previous account, it is newly created and lacks a genuine profile photo, and its content focuses heavily on political propaganda in favor of the Houthi group.

When we ran the same posting-time analysis script on this account, the results showed a slightly less intense posting pattern compared to the top account. However, it still published a relatively high number of posts at short, regular intervals—less than two minutes apart—suggesting a scheduled posting pattern and a high likelihood that the account is also automated and inauthentic.

Ranked third among the most active accounts using the "#مدري" (I Don’t Know) hashtag was the account "Salma” (Dz@sel_ma88), which posted 59 times. However, a review of the account’s archive revealed that all posts containing the hashtag appeared as comments—an engagement pattern typically used to amplify visibility. The account's overall content closely resembled that of the previous two accounts, with identical reposts and consistent political propaganda in support of the Houthi group.

When we applied the script to analyze its posting behavior, the account showed a less intense posting frequency, with a relatively natural distribution of posts throughout the day. Nonetheless, there were still instances of posts published at intervals of less than two minutes, indicating that the account is likely semi-automated or using a post-scheduling tool.

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Ranked fourth was the account “Abu Qaed Al Baydhani… Media 2” (@wert7715), which we previously identified as part of the Houthi propaganda machine. When we applied the code to analyze its posting behavior, the account initially appeared to post at a natural pace. However, a more detailed analysis revealed a distinct pattern: it posts intensively during specific time windows, with intervals of less than a minute between posts, followed by periods of inactivity, only to resume heavy posting later.

This cyclical posting behavior strongly suggests that the account is automated—or at the very least, relies on post-scheduling tools.

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Cross-Border Digital Conflicts

According to our analysis of the data sample, the initial assumption was that the accounts actively engaging with the "#مدري" (“I Don’t Know”) hashtag fall into two main groups. The first group consists of digital media personalities affiliated with or close to the Houthi movement, such as Abdel Hafiz Mu’jib and Mubarak Al Asali, who describes himself as "Editor-in-Chief of Al Maseer newspaper, political analyst-in-training, aspiring military analyst, and an employee at the Prime Minister’s Office in Sanaa."

The second group consists of automated bot accounts that work to amplify the campaign. We identified some of the most prominent of these accounts that post heavily under the "#مدري" (I Don’t Know) hashtag, including: @md9013712576636, @rajyallh13, @sel_ma88, and @wasam774. However, when we conducted a deeper analysis of the data and visualized it using Gephi to map account networks, different groupings began to emerge.

The network analysis, conducted using the ForceAtlas and Fruchterman algorithms, revealed that accounts engaging with the "#مدري" (I Don’t Know) hashtag are organized into multiple networks. The visualization shows a clear division or overlap between two large clusters—one at the bottom of the graph and another at the top. Each cluster is made up of tightly linked accounts that frequently interact with one another, suggesting a degree of internal coordination within each group.

According to the network analysis, the first cluster is led by several accounts, most notably that of Dr. Ahmed Mutahar Al Shami (@drahmedalshami). This account was created in 2019 and has over 300,000 followers. It serves as a prominent source from which many other accounts repost news about Yemen.

An investigation into the background of Dr. Ahmed Mutahar Al Shami, using his official website and publicly available sources, reveals that he is an Islamic preacher and a key ideological figure within the Houthi movement. He also holds leadership positions within the group known as "Ansar Allah." In a 2017 interview with Al Somoud newspaper, Al Shami was introduced as the head of the Mobilization Front, which coordinated between popular and official fronts during the military campaign known as "Operation Decisive Storm"—a campaign he referred to as "Saudi aggression."

In 2020, Yemeni Press published an article titled "Video: Ansar Allah Leader Dr. Ahmed Al Shami Explains Three Reasons Behind Yemen’s Wages Crisis," which summarized a video clip he shared on his personal account. All of this suggests that Al Shami plays a central role in the group’s ideological messaging and political propaganda efforts.

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Network analysis also revealed that one of the most prominent clusters engaging with the "#مدري" (I Don't Know) hashtag is led by a verified account belonging to Nasruddin Amer (@Nasr_Amer1), who has over 350,000 followers. Amer identifies himself in his profile bio as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Yemeni News Agency Saba and Deputy Head of the Media Authority of the Ansar Allah movement (the Houthis).

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His self-description suggests close ties to the leadership of the Houthi movement and a key role within its media apparatus. Deeper research also reveals him to be a prominent promoter of political propaganda supporting both the Houthis and Iran. He has appeared in several search results linking him to the dissemination of disinformation—for example, his commentary on violent incidents in 2021 allegedly involving Ethiopian and Somali migrants. Multiple sources, however, reported that the violence was actually perpetrated by Houthi-affiliated forces in response to a hunger strike by the migrants protesting poor conditions. The Yemeni outlet Al Mashhad even labeled him a “peddler of lies.”

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Across all the central accounts driving engagement with the hashtag "#مدري" (I Don’t Know), we observed a large number of surrounding accounts that consistently repost and amplify their content. In the network analysis, these appear as umbrella-like clusters radiating around the central nodes, indicating a coordinated effort to boost visibility.

One such central account surrounded by a dense web of interacting profiles is that of Abdel Hafiz Mujib (@hafeed000), whose role in amplifying the hashtag during its initial peak in early April was significant.

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The account of Abdel Hafiz Mujib has over 244,000 followers. He is a media figure affiliated with Al Sahat TV, a channel closely aligned with the Houthi group. A review of his online archive reveals his role, dating back to 2017, in justifying killings and assassinations carried out by the Houthis against opposition figures, including businessman Abdul Salam Al Shumeiri.

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Another media figure identified as actively engaging with the "#مدري" hashtag is a Yemeni account under the name Abdulghani Ali Al Zubaidi (@Abdlgni_AZubidi). Despite being relatively new—created in 2020—the account has amassed over 211,000 followers. Al Zubaidi describes himself as a "Researcher in political and military affairs," suggesting an effort to position himself as a specialized analytical voice, even though he is directly involved in promoting a politically charged campaign.

His account also features a pinned post where he states:
"This is my personal page. I do not hold any government position, nor am I a spokesperson for any government body in Sana'a. I alone take responsibility for what I post… whether it's based on information from my sources or otherwise. The most important thing is that what I publish does not harm the country's national security or negatively impact any individual."

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Upon investigating Al Zubaidi's background, it became clear that he writes for Al Maseerah newspaper and the Ansar Allah website, where he has published two articles. The first was about his meeting with a leader, and the second discussed the efforts made by the Houthi group in what he termed the "wages battle." However, an older report from 2023 in Yemeni Post referred to him as a leader within the Houthi group. Additionally, in January 2025, Sahafah.net published a report in which Al Zubaidi criticized the administration of Al Bayda’ Governorate, calling it a failure.

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However, the accounts interacting with the hashtag "#مدري" and their networks were not limited to Houthi-affiliated or close media and leadership figures. We also identified an entire network of automated accounts, led by the bot account “News 24 Abu Qaed Al Baydhani Media” (@aaa73753), whose interaction pattern we previously analyzed, confirming its role as part of the Houthi propaganda machine.

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However, the network analysis map revealed a strong pattern of interaction with another account, Abu Qaed Al Baydhani... Media 2 (@wert7715), whose activity we examined above and found to be, at the very least, semi-automated. This account played a central role as a bridge between the network of News 24 Abu Qaed Al Baydhani Media (@aaa73753) and another network centered around a verified account belonging to Anes Mansour (@anesmansory), who has over 847,000 followers. Mansour describes himself as a “media advisor, head of the Hona Aden Center for Strategic Studies, and a writer for @Arabi21News.”

Given that journalist Anes Mansour’s network is positioned at a central point between the two main clusters visible at the top and bottom of the network analysis map, we examined the accounts most actively engaging with his content—particularly those leaning toward the upper cluster. One of the most notable accounts was identified as “Sana’a (We Are Coming, Sana’a)” (@ArmnHanm15584); a recently created account that interacts with the hashtag "#مدري" (I Don’t Know) from a critical angle, voicing strong criticism of the Houthi group.

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A review of the account’s archive revealed that it frequently retweets content tied to hashtags critical of the Houthi group, including: (#الشعب_داري_ياحوثي) (The People Know, Houthi), #الحوثي_يتاجر_بالبترول_المغشوش (Houthi Trades In Fake Fuel), and #الحوثي_إيراني_لايمني (Houthis Are Iranian Not Yemeni). This clearly signals the account’s opposition to the group and indicates its role in a counter-campaign that surfaced amid the activity on "#مدري". We revisited and verified these hashtags, aiming to uncover the opposing cluster that is actively criticizing the Houthis.

A Counter-Campaign Urging the Houthis to Surrender

The network analysis of accounts active within the second cluster—those that opposed the "#مدري" campaign—revealed several central accounts that openly accuse the Houthi group of terrorism. However, in their effort to criminalize the group and criticize its authoritarian practices in areas under its control, some of these accounts went even further, explicitly expressing support for the U.S. airstrikes on Yemen and calling on the "Ansar Allah" movement to surrender.

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One of the most prominent accounts in this cluster is Raymond Hakim (@RaymondFHakim), a verified user with over 150,000 followers who describes himself as “an activist interested in Lebanese and Arab affairs – Two armies do not build a state.” A review of his post history reveals a consistently hostile stance toward both Hezbollah and the Houthis. At the same time, however, he openly supports U.S. airstrikes on Yemen, sharing posts that justify the attacks as direct strikes on Houthi headquarters and efforts to dismantle their military infrastructure—claims that were not backed by evidence and were not confirmed by U.S. Central Command.

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Further investigation into the account reveals that it belongs to a Lebanese activist closely affiliated with the Lebanese Forces party. The account frequently promotes political content in support of the party’s leader, Samir Geagea, aligning itself with his rhetoric and positions.

The second prominent account in the campaign opposing the "#مدري" (I Don’t Know) hashtag was that of Saudi journalist Mohammed Al Arab (@malarab1). This verified account has over 677,000 followers. Al Arab previously appeared in a televised interview on a Saudi channel, introduced as a "former war correspondent", under a striking headline: "I danced with death for thirty years, and I will announce the liberation of Sana’a." This highlights his openly hostile stance toward the Houthis, which aligns closely with the narrative of the Saudi-led Arab Coalition.

Although Mohammed Al Arab describes himself as a former war correspondent, his archive on X is filled with posts about Yemen presented as urgent news alerts, often narrated as if he were an eyewitness—without citing any credible sources. He consistently adopts the U.S. narrative and openly supports American airstrikes on Yemen.

What stands out as particularly suspicious, however, is a post in which he offers a 100,000 Saudi Riyal reward for anyone who provides information leading to the capture of Houthi members in the Ibb governorate.

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Another central account that emerged on the network analysis map is (Sheikh Jamal Al Mamari 🇾🇪 @JamalAlmamari11), a verified Yemeni account with around 36,000 followers. Along with his attacks on the Houthi group, he consistently shares political propaganda in support of Saudi Arabia and its political decisions.

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Al Mamari's account spreads misleading information regarding the deaths of Houthi members due to U.S. airstrikes, without providing any reliable evidence to support these claims. The account also regularly engages in incitement, such as identifying a specific location as a sarin gas production facility south of Saada, without offering any sources or proof to back it up. Despite being a Yemeni account, it consistently promotes political propaganda that aligns with the Saudi government's stance.

The network analysis map reveals that the three accounts (Mohammed Al Arab, Al Mamari, and Raymond Hakim) each appeared as central accounts within two overlapping networks. The first network consists of accounts that amplify the central account's content by resharing it, while the second network comprises accounts that engage with the central accounts through comments, whether supportive or critical.

Each of the three accounts we identified as linked to the counter-campaign against the "#مدري" (I Don’t Know) hashtag consistently participated in attacking Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthi group first, and later adopted posts that praise Saudi Arabia. This synergy between the accounts explains the interaction of a Lebanese account affiliated with the Lebanese Forces Party, a Saudi war correspondent, and a Yemeni activist, reflecting coordinated efforts among various regional actors. These three accounts also share a common use of specific hashtags, such as "#الحوثي_جماعة_إرهابي" (Houthis Are A Terrorist Group), "#الشعب_داري_ياحوثي" (People Know, Houthi), and "#أيام_الحوثي_الأخيرة" (Houthi’s Last Days).

"#الشعب_داري_ياحوثي" (People_Know, Houthi): A Campaign Against Houthi "Corruption"

We returned to using the Meltwater tool and identified these three hashtags as keywords. It became clear that they are part of an ongoing online campaign against the Houthi group in Yemen, which began last year and continued into the start of this year. Although the number of posts using these hashtags barely exceeded 18,000, the campaign achieved widespread visibility, reaching 121 million times, with a daily reach of 1.34 million.

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To accurately identify the counter-campaign against the "#مدري" (#Madri) hashtag, we excluded the hashtags "#الحوثي_جماعة_إرهابية" (Houthi Are A Terrorist Group) and "#أيام_الحوثي_الأخيرة" (Houthi’s Last Days), which have been active for extended periods, and focused solely on the hashtag "#الشعب_داري_ياحوثي" (People Know, Houthi). It was found that engagement with this hashtag peaked on April 10, 2025, the same day that the "#مدري" hashtag reached its peak activity. Although the number of posts using this hashtag did not exceed 15,000, it achieved widespread visibility, reaching 104 million times, with a daily reach of 1.15 million.

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Posting patterns revealed a clear variation in the type of engagement. Replies made up about 50% of the posts, while retweets and quote tweets together accounted for approximately 38%. In contrast, original content represented only about 13% of the total. This distribution indicates a degree of amplification through resharing, while also showing that nearly half of the posts took the form of discussions and responses.

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This distribution was reflected in the list of hashtags associated with "#الشعب_داري_ياحوثي" (People Know, Houthis). Three main categories of hashtags could be identified.

The first included those attacking the Houthi group, such as "#الحوثي_جماعة_إرهابية" (Houthis Are A Terrorist Group). The second category comprised supportive hashtags, like "#مدري" (I Don’t Know). The third consisted of descriptive hashtags related to ongoing events, such as "#القصف_الامريكي" (U.S. Bombing) and "#صنعاء" (Sana’a).

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This was also reflected in the word cloud of the most frequently used and prominent terms associated with the hashtag "#الشعب_داري_ياحوثي" (People Know, Houthis). It was similarly mirrored in the sentiment word cloud, which clearly showed a prevalence of negative sentiment in the posts using the hashtag.

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The list of countries where accounts interacting with the hashtag "#الشعب_داري_ياحوثي" (People Know, Houthis) are active closely resembled that of the "#مدري" (I Don’t Know) hashtag. Yemen topped the list in both cases, followed by Saudi Arabia. Egypt, the United States, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories also appeared among the most active countries, holding similarly high positions in the rankings.

A Counter Bot-Led Campaign 

To identify the most influential accounts engaging with the "#الشعب_داري_ياحوثي" (People Know, Houthis) hashtag, we extracted all related posts using Meltwater. We then analyzed the data and generated a list of the top accounts with the highest interaction levels on the hashtag.

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At the top of the list of the most active accounts engaging with the "#الشعب_داري_ياحوثي" (People Know, Houthis) hashtag was the account @MoslahAlraimi, which posted 104 times—84 of which were replies. However, the account was later found to be deactivated. We were still able to utilize the available data from the account’s previous posts to run a script that allowed us to analyze statistical patterns in its posting times.

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The results of the coded analysis revealed that the account posted intensively during specific hours, and over 50% of its posts were published with zero time intervals between them. This strongly indicates that the account is fully automated.

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Ranked next was the account @wadhamurshed (Wadha Murshed) with 87 posts. It's a relatively new account that actively posts against the Houthi group. The account owner describes herself as a “Yemeni journalist and human rights advocate.” Her content primarily focuses on criticizing the policies of Ansar Allah, highlighting issues such as the wage crisis, lack of freedoms, and the spread of militarization in areas under Houthi control.

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A coding analysis yielded results similar to the previous account, revealing an intense posting pattern during specific time windows and at a non-human pace. Numerous posts were published with a time gap of zero minutes between them, indicating that the account is fully automated.

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In third place came the account of Mustafa Ghulais (@GhulaisM), a verified Yemeni journalist who published 81 posts. His content focused on exposing the authoritarianism and corruption of the Houthi group, using the hashtag #الشعب_داري_ياحوثي (People Know, Houthi) to raise questions about what he described as the “corrupt, destructive, and failed practices” of the Houthi-run administration.

When we applied the code-based analysis to the account, the results showed a natural distribution of posting times throughout the day. However, a pattern of intense posting emerged at 2:00 PM, with short time gaps of less than two minutes between posts, indicating that the account is semi-automated or uses post scheduling tools.

This was noticeably different from the posting pattern of Abdulrahman Al Attawi’s account @bdalrhmn85644. The results of a code-based analysis showed that his posting pattern was naturally distributed throughout the day, without sharp temporal concentration as seen in automated accounts. However, a large number of posts were detected with time gaps of less than two minutes between them.‍

Abdulrahman Al Attawi's account @bdalrhmn85644 is a newly created but verified Saudi account, which posted 81 tweets under the hashtag "#الشعب_داري_ياحوثي" (The People Know, Houthi). He fully adopts the U.S. narrative regarding the conflict in Yemen, supporting U.S. airstrikes on Yemen under the pretext of eliminating the Houthi group, even in cases where reports indicate civilian casualties.

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The account @PptFV65QXgffMwh, which is clearly an unverified or fake account due to its random username, posted 74 tweets under the hashtag "#الشعب_داري_ياحوثي" (The People Know, Houthi). It adopted the same narrative promoted by previous accounts, describing the Houthi group as corrupt and failing in managing the areas under its control. However, what stands out in this account’s activity is its intense reposting of content from Saudi accounts, along with direct accusations against the Sultanate of Oman for supporting the Houthi group.

When the code was applied to the account @PptFV65QXgffMwh, the results showed an intense posting pattern at specific times of the day. Approximately half of the account's posts under the hashtag were published with a time gap of less than one minute, which does not align with normal human posting patterns. This clearly indicates that the account is either fully automated or uses scheduling programs for posts.

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It is clear that the campaign under the hashtag "#الشعب_داري_ياحوثي" (People Know, Houthi), despite having a strong narrative highlighting the corruption of the practices of the administration affiliated with the Ansar Allah group, is mostly driven by automated or semi-automated accounts. These accounts primarily spread political propaganda and adopt the American narrative regarding the airstrikes on Yemen, their objectives, and outcomes.