Amid the intensifying clashes between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and elements of the Free Syrian Army, coordinated activities emerged on social media targeting Kurdish groups that control vast areas in northern Syria and face open hostility from Turkey.

Despite the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime at the hands of the Syrian opposition, battles continue in a country torn apart by over a decade of civil war.

Various factions have asserted control over most of Syria’s territories, except for regions in the north and east which have for years been dominated by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This dominance followed the vacuum left by the retreat of the Syrian regime and the expansion of ISIS, which held those areas for a brief period.

Turkey regards the Kurdish groups within the SDF, supported by the United States, to be affiliated to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara officially designates as a "terrorist organization."

In the first half of December 2024, activity on anti-SDF hashtags surged, alongside the emergence of new ones, including: #قسد_لا تمثل_الأكراد (SDF does not represent the Kurds), #قسد_الدواعش_الصفر (SDF the yellow ISIS), #قسد_الارهابيه (SDF the terrorist), #قسد_من_خارج_الحدود (SDF from outside the borders), #قادة_قسد_ليسوا_سوريين (SDF leaders are not Syrians), #قسد_ترتكب_مجازر_شرق_الفرات (SDF committing massacres east of the Euphrates), and #SyriansRejectSDF.

These hashtags collectively contained at least 20,000 posts, reaching over 5.77 million views and generating 80,600 interactions (likes, retweets, replies, and comments), according to statistics from the Meltwater social media analytics tool.

The hashtags peaked in popularity three times during this period, particularly on December 5, 7, and 12, 2024. There was also a noticeable increase in engagement on December 9, just hours after the opposition took control of Damascus and Assad fled to Russia.

Periods of Hashtag Activity – Meltwater

Who is influencing the campaign?

A total of 6,575 accounts participated in the wave of posts on the hashtags, including accounts with thousands or even tens of thousands of followers. The content of these accounts reflects long-term efforts to mobilize against Kurdish groups—operating under the umbrella of the SDF—and their control of Syrian territories.

Several prominent participating accounts feature profile pictures displaying the old Syrian flag adopted by the opposition since 2011, as well as accounts claiming to represent tribal coalitions in eastern Syria. Among the influential accounts driving this wave were @samfreesyria777 and @shadoumeh, both of which have previously played key roles in coordinated campaigns supporting the Syrian opposition during the popular uprisings that led to the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Arabi Facts Hub had previously documented the participation of these two accounts in a coordinated campaign in October 2024, during the intensified Russian and Syrian aerial bombardments on opposition-held areas in Idlib. The campaign also celebrated the death of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah. At that time, these accounts played a significant role in amplifying the campaign through media mobilization.

The account @samfreesyria777 had previously engaged in regional campaigns, including a promotional campaign for Lebanese Forces Party leader Samir Geagea, using hashtags like #القوات_تكتسح (Lebanese Forces Sweep) and #طلاب_جمهورية_قوية (Students Of A Strong Republic). It also participated in cross-border campaigns involving accounts from various countries in the region that adopt an anti-Iranian stance, as seen in the hashtag #ملالي_الارهاب_الى_مزابل_التاريخ (Mullahs Of Terror To The Dustbin Of History). 

Indicators of coordination and mobilization

Analysis of the hashtag wave revealed several indicators of coordinated mobilization activity, most notably the nature of the accounts and shared posts, along with the unified tone and prevailing sentiments of incitement and provocation.

Posts directly originating from accounts constituted only 6% of the total, amounting to approximately 1,200 posts, while replies, comments, and shared posts in the form of “retweets/reposts” accounted for 84.4%, totaling 17,700 posts, according to Meltwater.

This is supported by direct observations of posts appearing as repeated replies containing only the campaign hashtags. For instance, the image below illustrates a series of consecutive replies published by the account @shadoumeh within very short time intervals. At 9:44 PM on December 17, 2024, the account published at least two posts at this exact time, paused for a few minutes, and then resumed activity in the same pattern.

This behavior clearly indicates deliberate and strategic activity designed to amplify the hashtags’ messages and increase their visibility.

The high percentage of replies and shared posts was accompanied by the dominance of negative sentiments within the campaign's rhetoric, which reached 84%. This figure is notably high compared to typical levels observed in organic conversations, further reinforcing suspicions about the coordinated and deliberate nature of this campaign.

Syria, Germany, and Turkey ranked as the top three geographic locations known for originating posts related to the hashtags. But 14,300 posts came from accounts with unidentified locations, which could indicate coordinated activity.

For instance, our campaign analysis highlighted the account @Alaa228314, a newly created account established this month. The account does not list its geographic location in its profile and has no followers. Its posting pattern resembled spam, similar to the account @shadoumeh, which also lacks information about its location.

Similarly, the account @support_023 was observed to have over 20,000 posts since its creation in 2020—a highly unusual rate that suggests activity differing significantly from typical personal account behavior during normal periods. Notably, the account includes the term "retweet" in its profile description, signaling its role in activities aimed at boosting engagement and amplifying hashtags on X. This pattern has previously been identified by Arabi Facts Hub during analyses of coordinated online campaigns in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.

Instigating rhetoric

According to reports from local media outlets aligned with the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition, the SDF committed violations against civilians, including recruiting child soldiers in areas they controlled in coordination with Bashar al-Assad’s regime, such as Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Jazira.

Following Assad's fall, these regions witnessed street celebrations. However, opposition-supporting accounts claimed that SDF forces violently suppressed the festivities, allegedly opening fire on civilians. These claims were backed by circulated video footage purportedly captured during the celebrations. As part of the campaign against the SDF, participants shared widely disseminated videos alleged to document abuses committed by Kurdish forces over the years of Syria's civil war.

The campaign hashtags included language characterized by hate speech and incitement, such as “SDF pigs,” “SDF donkeys,” “SDF terrorist faction,” and “the yellow ISIS.” Other posts called for the "extermination" or "eradication of the yellow cancer," referring to the yellow flag of the SDF.

Accounts also used imagery to depict the SDF as a chameleon, referencing the Kurdish bloc’s shifting stance between the revolution and Assad’s regime. One notable post by @samfreesyria777 featured such imagery, tagging the account of the spokesperson for opposition military operations, Lieutenant Colonel Hasan Abdelghani (@hasanabdalgany). 

Some accounts also amplified the official Turkish narrative regarding the battles in northern Syria, such as @33arAmmar, which was highly active on the campaign hashtags. This account frequently retweeted posts from Turkish accounts that relayed statements from Turkish officials about the ongoing events. These posts often described Kurdish forces—deemed by Ankara to include members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—as part of a "terrorist organization."

One such post echoed a statement by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan regarding the potential for a Turkish military operation against the SDF. He remarked:
"There is a new administration in Damascus, and currently, the issue of the SDF is their top priority. If they address this matter properly, there will be no need for us to intervene."

On the other hand, Kurdish accounts became active in support of the SDF, promoting the narrative that they were fighting against "mercenaries" and "terrorists from Turkey." Supporters of both sides commonly exchange accusations of terrorism through social networks.

Kurdish accounts also promoted the SDF's narrative regarding the potential risks of opposition forces advancing into their areas of control, particularly the possible escape of thousands of ISIS fighters who have been detained by the SDF with U.S. assistance during the international coalition's battles against ISIS.