Amid the ongoing fighting in Sudan, Arabi Facts Hub has identified inauthentic online activity, driven by networks of fake accounts associated with different factions in the conflict, in addition to a significant surge of misinformation.

The Sudanese army has been engaged in fierce battles across various parts of Sudan including Khartoum, since late September 2024. Recent reports indicate that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been losing ground as the army advances. In the middle of these developments, various online campaigns emerged, promoting the narratives of different sides in the conflict. These campaigns particularly focused on Egypt's alleged involvement in supporting the Sudanese army contrasted with the accusations of UAE’s backing of the RSF.

The term "unidentified aircraft" in Arabic became one of the most trending topics in Egypt for several days, reaching its peak on September 29, 2024, with over 900 posts on X in a single day. Most of these posts linked the Sudanese army's advances to the appearance of unidentified military planes conducting airstrikes in Sudan, targeting RSF forces.

The debate over these unidentified aircrafts was fueled by both old archival footage and recent videos from ongoing battles, which were widely shared on social media. Between September 1 and October 8, 2024, a total of around 1,800 posts on this topic were published, garnering at least 2.172 million views. These posts generated 15,648 interactions (likes, shares, replies, and comments), according to data from Meltwater, a leading social media analytics tool.

Periods of Activity of "Unidentified Aircraft" – Meltwater

Egypt ranked first in terms of number of posts per geographical location, with 346 entries, followed by Sudan with 68, the United States with 38, Saudi Arabia with 32, and the United Arab Emirates with 17. In contrast, posts from unknown locations are estimated to exceed 1,190, surpassing those from identified locations, according to Meltwater statistics. This suggests potential manipulation of platform "X" policies to promote a specific narrative.

Pro-government Influencers

During the same period, 1,372 accounts on "X" discussed the topic of "unidentified aircrafts" with prominent Egyptian accounts emerging to promote Egypt's role in recent military developments that gave advantage to the Sudanese army. Among these accounts are "El Maestro" (@BASSEMELMASSRY), Mohamed Kandil (@MrKandiel), and Nona El Sisi (@NadiaMa14905909). These large accounts, followed by tens of thousands, are known for promoting conspiracy theories, amplifying the Egyptian government’s political propaganda, and attacking its critics.

The campaign extended to other social media platforms such as Facebook, TikTok, and YouTube, supported by posts from influencers who regularly express the positions of the Egyptian government and participate in its official events. Notable among these is the "Al Wa’i Nour” page (Awareness is Light)  run by influencer Mohamed Nour, who has over one million followers on Facebook, and the page of Ahmed Mubarak, which boasts two million followers.

Aerial Passage Generates Disinformation

Misleading information about unidentified aircraft has circulated, relying on old or doctored videos, or footage with context that is unrelated to the spreading claims. For instance, videos were shared with claims from those promoting them that they document the moment an Egyptian military aircraft took off from Aswan en route to Sudan to strike the RSF. Most of these clips spread on TikTok before quickly migrating to other platforms, including "X."

Despite the circulating videos being recent and concurrent with the spreading claims, these videos were actually recorded during air shows at the celebration of World Tourism Day in Aswan on September 26, 2024. This is confirmed by coverage from Egyptian media outlets of the event.

A video was also repeatedly shared with an incorrect narrative claiming that “unidentified aircraft targeted RSF locations in Khartoum and Al Jili axis.” Other accounts commented on the video, stating: “Keep in mind that no ordinary pilot can strike a target from such a close distance without hitting only the intended target and avoiding civilian casualties; this requires a professional pilot.”

Upon closer examination of the video, it becomes clear that it is of low quality and has been altered using video editing tools. The original version dates back to April 16, 2023, which was the second day of the war. We found the first version of the video published on the well-known page "Al Zol," which focuses on covering the conflict in Sudan. The original clips do not show any military aircraft.

Hemedti’s Accusations

In the months leading up to the outbreak of the war in Sudan, pages supporting the RSF launched campaigns attacking Egypt, inciting hostility against the Egyptian troops stationed at Merowe Airport in northern Sudan. On the day the war began, the official pages of Hemedti's forces published videos from the Merowe base, claiming control over it from the “agent armed forces” and “Egyptian occupiers.” This incident sparked outrage in Egypt, and the Egyptian government stated that its forces were present at the airport "to conduct training exercises with their Sudanese counterparts."

Days after the surge of “unidentified aircraft” claims, the RSF leader appeared in a video, making unsubstantiated allegations against Egypt. In response, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied any involvement of Egyptian aircraft in the ongoing battles in Sudan.

Hemedti adopted the propaganda narratives circulating in Egypt about the "unidentified aircraft," claiming that Egypt "is training the Sudanese army and has supplied it with Chinese K8 aircraft." He added, "Our forces in Jebel Moya in Sennar state were killed and attacked treacherously by Egyptian aircraft... We have remained silent for too long about the involvement of Egyptian aircraft in the war, hoping they would pull back, but they have now gone too far."

In August 2024, the Sudanese army denied receiving any K8 aircraft from Egypt, stating that it "has had fleets of this type of Chinese-made aircraft since the beginning of this millennium... and there is no need to seek assistance from any friendly country to obtain more of these aircraft."

The Sudanese army indeed possesses 12 K8 aircraft, also known as Hongdu JL 8, according to Air Force Technology. There is a photo of three aircraft of the same type displaying the Sudanese flag on Airliners.

Meanwhile, accounts supporting the RSF and the UAE launched another campaign on "X" to attack the Sudanese army shortly after the UAE accused the army of bombing the residence of the UAE ambassador in Khartoum, promoting misleading information in this regard. In a press conference in New York late September 2024, army commander Abdel Fattah Al Burhan accused Abu Dhabi of providing support to Hemedti's forces. The Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied the bombing of the ambassador's residence, stating that his condition is good and that the residence is not being used as a diplomatic mission.

Despite this denial, the website "Sudan Barq" published a video claiming that it is “leaked footage of a Sudanese army soldier documenting the damage from inside the residence of the UAE ambassador to Sudan, boasting to the army leadership about the success of the targeting operation.” The identity of the speaker in the video is not revealed, as they move among the debris of a house whose features are unclear.

Upon reviewing the website "Sudan Barq," one can observe a significant number of positive posts published about the UAE, promoting themes such as “the goodness of the UAE" and "the Genius of Zayed."

On X, "Sudan Barq" states that it is based in the famous Mek Nimir Street in Khartoum. However, the transparency data for the account’s Facebook page reveals that three of the page's administrators have unknown geographic locations. Additionally, the data for the site's YouTube channel, established on February 17, 2020, indicates that it is managed from the United Arab Emirates.

Later, a network of fake accounts—presenting themselves as Sudanese—reposted the videos attributed to the UAE ambassador's residence. Among these accounts are some that  the Arabi Facts Hub has previously revealed have a role in influence campaigns supporting the Rapid Support Forces and promoting UAE interests, as well as amplifying discussion about the role of Iran and Islamic forces in the country. This includes accounts like Zahia Al Haili and Oyoun Al Sudan.

The words and phrases accompanying the videos of the ambassador's residence were repeatedly shared, such as “Sana’s Army,” a term that pro-RSF accounts have used to criticize the Sudanese army. We also observed that these accounts promote a single narrative expressing concerns about “Sudan's international isolation” and the Sudanese army's efforts to “cut ties with neighboring countries.” They convey rejection of “a narrative propagated by the Islamists to the global public... which is merely a distortion and a grudge against the UAE to put the country in a predicament,” seemingly referring to statements made by Abdel Fattah Al Burhan in New York.

Examples of these grammatically incorrect posts include:

• We are accustomed to war crimes from Sanaa’s Army, but we will not get used to their insistence on cutting our ties with our allies. 
• Diplomatic facilities have not been spared from the brutality of their aircraft, nor have civilians been spared their crimes.
• The international isolation of #Sudan is the ultimate goal of these remnants [of the past regime] and armed movements. The more isolated Sudan becomes, the more it falls into the trap of total control by these destructive groups that have seized Sudan’s wealth and the rights of its people. Those who ignited the war on April 15 are targeting the severing of Sudan's relations with neighboring countries.

At a time when we greatly need external assistance, the Sudanese army is working to sever ties with neighboring countries without considering the plight of the poor people who need support from all nations.

Campaigns by the Sudanese Army

On the other side there were, accounts that amplified the narrative of the Sudanese army while attacking the UAE. Several relevant hashtags gained traction, including “#Sudan_Wins,” “#God_Unprotect_the_UAE,” “#UAE_Supports_Terrorism,” and “#UAE_Kills_Sudanese.” For example, the hashtag #UAE_Kills_Sudanese amassed 544,000 posts since its first appearance on November 6, 2023. With participation from at least 26,000 accounts, over 93,000 posts were shared using the hashtag from September 12 to October 11, 2024, achieving more than 33 million views, according to Meltwater statistics.

During the same period, the rate of reashared content reached approximately 60 percent, equating to 55,800 posts. This figure is close to the number of posts with unknown geographic locations (57,800 posts), while original posts constituted only 4.2 percent, or about 4,000 posts; this indicates a significant level of inauthentic electronic activity across social media platforms.

Type of Posts Published under the Hashtag #UAE_Kills_Sudanese – Meltwater

 Our analysis of the hashtag does not necessarily imply that everything within it is incorrect, especially regarding UAE influence in Sudan. However, it has become a point of interest due to the presence of non-organic activity associated with it, particularly from accounts followed by tens or hundreds of thousands of followers, which has contributed to the hashtag's increased popularity.

Sudanese and Yemeni accounts known for their activity in spreading misleading information or launching campaigns have become active under this hashtag. It is noteworthy that prominent influencers have engaged with the hashtag, such as the account "Bint Khalifa," Yassine Ahmed, Yemeni journalist Anis Mansour, Adel Al Hosni, and Wissam Youssef.

One of the participants in the hashtag #UAE_Kills_Sudanese asked his followers to promote the hashtag, pushing it to the top of trending topics on September 30, 2024.

Media reports have indicated that the UAE provides military support to the RSF, which the Gulf state has repeatedly denied.